"Thoughts and Memories" are written by a staunch follower of Realpolitik – and are especially interesting in times when Europe’s history determined not on paper or in the virtual universe, but on the battlefields. The third and final part of the most striking quotes from Prince Bismarck memoirs presents several remarks about foreign policy illusions. As well as characteristics of the superpowers of the second half of the XIX century.

THE MAN & THE STATESMAN (PART THREE)

Being The Reflections and Reminiscences of OTTO, PRINCE VON BISMARCK
HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS, NEW YORK AND LONDON, 1899

ILLUSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY

Even in the last century it was perilous to reckon on the constraining force of the text of a treaty of alliance when the conditions under which it had been fasten were changed; to-day it is hardly possible for the government of a Great Power to place its resources unrestrictedly at .the disposal of a friendly state when the sentiment of the people disapproves it. (vol.2, р. 270)

All contracts between great states cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by 'the struggle for existence.' No great nation, will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to contract when it is compelled to choose between the two. The maxim 'ultra posse nemo obligatur' holds good in spite of all treaty formulas whatsoever, nor can any treaty guarantee the degree of zeal and the amount of force that will be devoted to the discharge of obligations when the private interest of those who lie under them no longer reinforces the text and its earliest interpretation. (vol.2, р. 273-4)

The impulse to conquest is no less an attribute of England, North America, Russia, and other countries than of Napoleonic France, and as soon as power and opportunity are at hand moderation and love of justice have a hard task in keeping even the most legitimate monarchy within bounds. (vol.1, р.197)

…we must do our best to prevent war or limit it. We must reserve our hand, and not allow ourselves before the proper time to be pushed out of a waiting into an active attitude by any impatience, by the desire to oblige others at the expense of the country, by vanity or other provocation of this kind; otherwise plectuntur Achivi. (vol.2, р.241)


AUSTRIA

The future of Austria, regarded in herself, cannot be reckoned upon with that certainty which is demanded when the conclusion of durable and, so to speak, organic treaties is contemplated. The factors which must be taken into account in this shaping are as manifold as is the mixture of her populations, and to their corrosive and occasionally disruptive force must be added the incalculable influence that the religious element may from time to time, as the power of Rome waxes or wanes, exert upon the directing personalities. Not only Panslavism and the Bulgarian or Bosnian, but also the Servian, the Roumanian, the Polish, the Czechish questions, nay even to-day the Italian question in the district of Trent, in Trieste, and on the Dalmatian coast, may serve as points of crystallisation not merely for Austrian, but for European crises... (vol.2, р. 278)


ENGLAND

A decision, memorable in the world's history, of the secular struggle between the two neighbouring peoples was at stake, and in danger of being ruined …with no historical justification, influences which owed their efficacy, not to political considerations but to feelings which the terms humanity and civilisation, imported to us from England, still rouse in German natures. Even during the Crimean war it was preached to us from England, and not without effect on our mood, that we ought to take up arms for the Turks 'for the saving of civilisation.' (vol.2, р. 121)

...England grudges us any chances of maritime development in commerce or fleet, and she is envious of our industry… (vol.1, p.201)


RUSSIA

In point of material force I held a union with Russia to have the advantage. (vol.2, р. 256)

In this situation the party of the ‘Wochenblatt,’ as it was called, played a curious double game. …The aim specified in these, which Prussia should strive as the champion of Europe to attain, was the partition of Russia by the forfeiture of the Baltic provinces, including St. Petersburg, to Prussia and Sweden, the loss of the entire territory of the Republic of Poland in its widest extent, and the disintegration of the remainder by a division between Great and Little Russians, regardless of the fact that the greater part of Little Russia had once formed a part of the Polish territory when at its largest. …any arrangement likely to satisfy Poland in the provinces of Prussia and Posen and even in Silesia is impossible without breaking up and de-composing of Prussia. (vol.1, р. 119-21)

I represented to him that we had absolutely no real cause for a war with Russia, and no interest in the Eastern question that could possibly justify a war with Russia, or even the sacrifice of our prolonged good relations with Russia. On the contrary, every victorious war against Russia, considering our mutual interests as neighbours, would burden us not only with a lasting feeling of revenge on Russia's part, which we should have drawn on ourselves without any real cause for war, but also with a very redoubtable problem, namely, the solution of the Polish question in a form that would be tolerable to Prussia. If our own interests spoke in no way for, but rather against, a breach with Russia, we should without provocation be attacking our hitherto friend and perpetual neighbour either out of fear of France or for the beaux yeux of England and Austria. (vol.1, р. 124-5)

…I, without representing Russian policy, saw no reason for risking our long-continued peace with Russia for other than Prussian interests ; and I considered any steps taken by Prussia against Russia, for interests that were remote from us, to be the result of our fear of the Western Powers and of our discreet respect for England. (vol.1, р.140)

In our position and with our historical development in Europe, we ought to rejoice whenever we find Powers in whom we encounter no sort of competition of political interests, as is the case, so far, with us and Russia. …with Russia we shall never have the necessity for war, unless Liberal stupidities or dynastic blunders falsify the situation. (vol.1, р. 247)

I believe that it would be advantageous for Germany if the Russians in one way or another, physically or diplomatically, were to establish themselves at Constantinople and had to defend that position. (vol.2, р. 288)

As regards England, the position of modem Russia might perhaps be considered as improved if it ruled Constantinople; but as regards Austria and Germany, Russia would be less dat^rous as long as it remained in Constantinople. (v.2, р. 289)

Peace between Germany and Russia may be imperilled by the systematic fomentation of ill-feeling... (vol.2, р.277)

In face of this eventuality it makes in our favour that Austria and Russia have opposing interests in the Balkan, while none such in strength enough to occasion an open breach and actual struggle exist between Russia and Prussia with Germany. This advantage, however, may be taken from us — thanks to the peculiar character of the Russian constitution by personal misunderstanding and maladroit policy, no less easily to-day than when Czarina. Elizabeth was induced by the bitter bon mots of Frederick the Great to accede to the Franco-Austrian alliance. (vol.2, р.281)


Published: 19/06/23