MODERN ARMIES – THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS (PART II)

PART I  /  PART II  /  PART III

How will this happen?

As it seems, thanks to the asymmetric superiority mentioned in the last paragraph of the previous part. Brief theoretical introduction:

A system with a network structure developed evolutionary from mechanical models (technical systems) to network systems with one mind (decision-making element), and further to purposeful multi-intelligent (social) systems with a network structure (first of all, information and telecommunication networks, and then modern economy in the form of international (interstate) division of labor and organization of transnational corporations).

A system with a network structure developed evolutionary from mechanical models (technical systems) to network systems with one mind (decision-making element), and further to purposeful multi-intelligent (social) systems with a network structure (first of all, information and telecommunication networks, and then modern economy in the form of international (interstate) division of labor and organization of transnational corporations).

The main result of such transformation is the acquisition by the system of the ability to perform non-linear actions (to implement non-linear functions) based on: a. high situational awareness, b. short control cycle and c. priority of horizontal interaction between elements of the network structure of battle order, which provides an asymmetric superiority over systems with a classical linear functions. Thus, if the modern socio-economic structure of the warring social groups acquires the forms and methods of solving everyday tasks inherent to multi-intelligent social systems with a network structure, then the nature of modern combat and operations will correspond to them.¹

Another glance into the past:

Until the 80s of the XX century, the tasks of the operation were solved mainly by large formations (rifle, motorized infantry, tank, mechanized divisions) and units with the support of equally bulky units of missile/artillery, bomber/ground strike/fighter aircraft. It created high densities of forces and means in the directions of the main strike, the concentration of the main efforts or maneuver. However, already in the 90s (in particular, during Operation Desert Storm) it turned out that smaller formations - battalion tactical groups (BTGs) — with a same, but a smaller set of forces and means of reinforcement and comprehensive support could solve the same tasks. At the same time, due to the better situational awareness of the BTG commander and shortened C2 cycle (especially when they were provided with the necessary independence, organization and maintenance of horizontal interaction/mutual support), the tasks of the operation as a whole were solved more flexibly and rationally, i.e. effectively. In addition, adversary’s reinforced formation, faced with several such BTGs, turned out to be clumsy, and the result was the same as, figuratively speaking, collision of a large cow with a pack of small wolves.

However, at the threshold of the XX—XXI centuries the BTGr themselves began to represent a "big cow" in the confrontation with IAG groups - a network of small, but autonomous and independent tactical groups numbering no more than one or two infantry squads. Flexibly coordinated among themselves along the lines of horizontal interaction, these small groups did not represent a typical object for fire destruction and, as a result, were poorly identified by intelligence means and evaluated by headquarters. They almost unhindered and consistently infiltrated to the routes of avant-garde units columns, main forces, second echelons, artillery and logistic units, inflicting fire damage and evading return fire (strike) even before the BTGs commanders had time to at least to assess the situation. It should be noted that such a nature of actions is not the result of comprehension, development and mastering of a new concept of warfare preparation and conduct. It simply turned out to be the only possible way of survival and further actions in such circumstances. It was predetermined by the social atmosphere of societies using modern technologies (information and communication, social, communal, commercial, etc.), including even archaic communities.

However, one should not hope that the process of mastering and using the new concept will turn out to be a simple matter or a kind of magic wand.

Increased accuracy, striking power and range of modern weapons, a sharp decrease in the quantity and quality of human mobilization resources, domestic political intolerance to (significant) losses of military personnel, high cost, cooperation and long production times of modern weapons, forces governments and societies to face the need to find solutions in several spheres simultaneously:

• economy - i.e. provision of the armed forces with the required number of modern high-tech weapons and military equipment;
• the social component of military affairs presupposes situational awareness, efficiency and rationality of delegating the rights to use weapons, adaptability of management, activity, efficiency, training, coherence and experience of personnel;
• the managerial component of military affairs involves a radical revision of the main issues of management, training and psychological training, combat cohesion of units, significantly more thorough coordination, selection of command staff and preservation of the personnel base of detachment/unit under any conditions;
• social – i.e. provision of a high level of secondary and higher education, necessary both for the management of high-tech military and military equipment, and for actions within multi-intelligent management system; high resistance of society to moral and psychological stress; and, most importantly, a healthy atmosphere of civil entente in a society governed by a competent state apparatus.

Published: 18/01/23