MODERN ARMIES – THE NATURE OF OPERATIONS (PART III)

PART I  /  PART II  /  PART III

How to achieve the implementation of abilities of conducting actions in a net-centric combat order highlighted at the end of the previous part?

Let's disappoint those who present it as a perfect novelty, and once again turn to the past. The defeat of Napoleon in 1806 was considered so humiliating by the Germans (then Prussians) that they worked tirelessly for more than half a century to improve their military machine.¹ In addition to the military components themselves, the spheres of education, the economy were reformed, and most importantly, social relations themselves underwent significant changes. As a result, victories were won over Denmark, Austria-Hungary and France, the Second Reich emerged. It successfully (before the US intervention) fought on two fronts, and in World War II the tactical and operational skill of Germans remained indisputable. They constantly demonstrated the ability to conduct operations against superior enemy forces, in isolation from the main forces, in fragmented and intermittent battle formations, in an unclear situation - finally, being enveloped.

It was then that the basic principles were formed that ensured the high combat effectiveness of the German military machine:²

1. Imposing operational pace on the enemy in order to deprive him of the ability to respond in a timely manner.
2. Continuous striking and advancing (even surrounded) on directions most vulnerable to enemy, creating constant threat to his flanks, rear and communications. (It implies the dispersed order of detachments at all levels, so that enemy trying to attack a part of the battle order is at risk of being hit and outflanked from as many directions as possible).
3. Incessant, proactive fire damage with an emphasis on accuracy.
4. Tasks set within a general framework (with minimal detail), authorizing subordinates to choose methods for their implementation independently.
5. Continuous mutual support at all levels and between all branches of the armed forces. (Assumes full confidence in the forces operating on the flanks and covering the rear, as well as fire support units. In turn, the main strike detachment receives all possible support from neighbours).
6. Building the battle order in accordance with the most effective ranges of various weaponry.
7. Analysis and comprehension of both positive and negative experience of combat operations with the fastest possible practical adjustment to their constantly changing nature.
8. The fighting spirit of personnel, which will aim all their actions to one goal – the search and destruction of the enemy, and will prompt optimal solutions in all situations, including non-standard ones.
9. Promotion to officers after mandatory service at private and NCO level. (That is why, when the commander in charge of the operation is in the unit performing the most important task at the moment (two steps below), subordinates deservedly trust him as having successfully passed all stages of a military career; in addition, stable objective feedback is provided).

Thus, most of the elements and approaches of conducting actions in a net-centric battle formation have been formed for a long time and have repeatedly been tested in wartime. Without downplaying the importance of economic, scientific and other potentials in building modern armed forces ready for net-centric wars, let's state that at the heart of all this is a high-quality education system that raises both genuine citizens and broad-minded warriors. As the saying attributed to Bismarck says: "the Prussian schoolteacher won the war".


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1. Karl Demeter, The German Officer-Corps in Society and State, 1650-1945: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965
2. Об важной особенности немецкой методики тактической подготовки; Cochenhausen, Friedrich von, Taktisches Handbuch für den Truppenführer und seinen Gehilfen Verlag: Mittler, 1936

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Published: 21/01/23